Since Obama took office, U.S. foreign assistance has been going through some historic changes. A renewed appreciation for the role that development plays in U.S. foreign affairs and a rebuilding of its ranks; the gradual integration of development budget, activities, and goals into U.S. defense and diplomatic strategies (and vice-versa in some cases, the “three D’s”); elevating USAID as the lead in U.S. foreign assistance while at the same time reforming it to be a smarter, more efficient, results-based agency.
The Quadrenniel Diplomacy and Develop Review, inagurated last Thursday encapsulates these changes in a policy that is sure to be a watershed document in U.S. foreign policy history.
Read it here: http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/
Showing posts with label American Foreign Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label American Foreign Policy. Show all posts
Wednesday, December 22, 2010
Sunday, November 9, 2008
Africa's Election
This election year wasn’t the first that I’ve spent overseas—in 1992 my family was living in Japan when Clinton was voted into office. But this year was the first time I’ve voted abroad (although in the end write-in ballots don’t count unless there’s a tie) and it’s the first time my voting milieu has been non-Americans.
Honestly, there were many some moments that I felt less of a loyal American citizen than my Beninese neighbors. When, for example, they would feed me updates on the election campaign (when I for example had grown tired of fighting shortwave radio fuzz). Or on the evening of November 4th when many pulled all-nighters to watch the results come in while I slept soundly.
Granted, staying current this year hasb been a bit tricky: I have no television, and my comprehension of French news broadcasts shuts down pretty early in the evening.
But I was quite surprised at how fervently my town, Benin, and the rest of Africa followed the elections. Of course, it was with just as much fervency that Africa embraced America’s new president. This realization was settled by the many felicitations that I received; by the news footage I saw of Kenyan’s dancing; and by the BBC radio call-ins I heard enthusiastically supporting a “son of Africa” in the White House.
I was actually taken by surprise by how powerful a thing it was for many Africans, a product of several factors: Obama's skin color, his direct biographical roots to Kenya, and the newness of his political ethos. I think that for the Beninese this last factor (which Obama and supporters has chosen to sum in the word "change") might have carried special weight: Benin's popular president Yayi Boni has also self-stylized his politics in one word: changement.
An American leaving abroad couldn't help but be moved by how emotive and engaged Africans were over the U.S. elections. Of course, much of this was due to the symbolism of it all. For all their interest, most Africans (along w/ Americans) know little how Obama's presidency will practically affect their lives, especially in the areas of trade and U.S. Aid policy.
Honestly, there were many some moments that I felt less of a loyal American citizen than my Beninese neighbors. When, for example, they would feed me updates on the election campaign (when I for example had grown tired of fighting shortwave radio fuzz). Or on the evening of November 4th when many pulled all-nighters to watch the results come in while I slept soundly.
Granted, staying current this year hasb been a bit tricky: I have no television, and my comprehension of French news broadcasts shuts down pretty early in the evening.
But I was quite surprised at how fervently my town, Benin, and the rest of Africa followed the elections. Of course, it was with just as much fervency that Africa embraced America’s new president. This realization was settled by the many felicitations that I received; by the news footage I saw of Kenyan’s dancing; and by the BBC radio call-ins I heard enthusiastically supporting a “son of Africa” in the White House.
I was actually taken by surprise by how powerful a thing it was for many Africans, a product of several factors: Obama's skin color, his direct biographical roots to Kenya, and the newness of his political ethos. I think that for the Beninese this last factor (which Obama and supporters has chosen to sum in the word "change") might have carried special weight: Benin's popular president Yayi Boni has also self-stylized his politics in one word: changement.
An American leaving abroad couldn't help but be moved by how emotive and engaged Africans were over the U.S. elections. Of course, much of this was due to the symbolism of it all. For all their interest, most Africans (along w/ Americans) know little how Obama's presidency will practically affect their lives, especially in the areas of trade and U.S. Aid policy.
Friday, May 30, 2008
Is Bénin Among the “Bottom Billion?”
I am reading The Bottom Billion by Oxford Economist Paul Collier. It is a book that for me probably ranks as one of the most insightful works among the last several years’ worth of writings and arguments that I’ve happened to digest on the theme of “development.”
In reality, “development” and the bloc of nations constituting the most “undeveloped” part of the world are ideas which have very much outlived the definitions that might have been pinned to them 60 years ago, as well as the periodic adjustments that have been made to these categories thereafter. Collier states that most of what was the developing world is now very much on its way, and what remains is a group of 58 nations—constituting about a billion people—who are “stuck,” not just in low income and poverty, but in a worse way: without growth, which translates to pandemic paucities of hope within these nations, and a new “diverging” world without.
Collier attributes the condition of a nation’s being stuck to 4 “development traps,” each Bottom Billion nation essentially being snagged by at least of these traps. 73% nations have recently experienced civil war or coups. 29% suffer from the drags of natural resource-dominated economies. 30% fit the profile of being landlocked, resource-scare and with bad neighbors. And 76% have been through a prolonged period of bad governance and poor economic policy. While each of these realities themselves slow or deplete growth, Collier labels them as traps because the conditions are self and inter-perpetuating.
Is Bénin Trapped?
Africa happens to be the epicenter of the Bottom Billion—not exclusively (there are others outside Africa) but enough such that Collier can rename the Bottom Billion “Africa +,” meaning a lot of African and some others. I myself read Bottom Billion with the continual curiosity of whether Bénin has in fact made Collier’s list of 58 nations. Collier doesn’t list the Bottom Billion countries by name, though he uses many as case examples throughout, including Nigeria, Niger Burkina Faso, and perhaps also Togo, all of whom are Bénin’s only neighbors.
According to the UN’s Human Development Index (a composite ranking that seeks to quantify the quality of life for the average citizen in a given country, then to compare this level of life with that of other countries) it is evident that Bénin is among the world’s poorest nations, in 2005 it was ranked the 163rd most poor of 177 nations. But what about in terms of growth or development traps? That is, the average Béninese may very well be poor, but is Bénin as a whole free of development traps such that the average Béninese can in good faithharbor hope that things will get better?
It’s clear that Bénin has never been snagged by two traps: Bénin it is not land-locked, nor has it discovered any lucrative natural resources within its national bounderies (“yet” one might add…an estimated million barrels of oil was recently just found off nearby Ghana’s coast).
However, Bénin did suffer from some of Africa’s worst Economic Policy during 1970s and 1980s which earned it the nickname the “Cuba of Africa.” In the end the economic fallout of these policies were so horribly evident to both citizens and leadership alike that they prompted in 1990 what I think might be the region’s only “peaceful revolution” to democracy. Bénin has, however, seen prolonged armed conflict and instability: before its shift to Marxism, Bénin's government was subjected to 5 coups d’etats in less than a decade. So it looks like two traps have snagged Bénin at some point in the past. But, depending on what kind of time parameters Collier’s trap categories assume, perhaps Bénin has successfully “escaped” one or both of these: Is two decades of attempted reform and over 35 years of internal peace long enough?
It may be worth noting—as Collier does—that other development traps have been proffered by other economists, most notably the “health” trap by Economist Jeffrey Sachs (put forward in The End of Poverty) a category of snares that Bénin would most likely fit into.
A Realist’s Insights
At the end of the day, I don’t think Collier’s book is meant to be read this way, as interesting as it may be to try to deduce the technical preconditions of the Bottom Billion and the exhaustive list of its constituent’s names. Rather, Collier makes many new insights on economic development, particularly for the African countries that are the materially “poorest” and proposes that Industrial Nation leaders must complement aid with certain trade policies, international laws and charters, and even military interventions in order to set the stage for escape from these growth traps. Though ultimately a conservative himself, (at the end of the day, enduring reform and change can only come from bold reformers within the nation itself), Collier acts as an alternative voice of realism between the rivaling opinion camps of economists Jeffrey Sachs (more Foreign Aid is the solution) and William Easterly (development through markets).
No matter the reader’s political-economic predisposition, even taking Collier’s claims only as suggestions has the potential to refresh the ongoing conversation on “development”…a subject whose research very much needs honest and constructive refreshment, given its complex nature and high stakes.
In reality, “development” and the bloc of nations constituting the most “undeveloped” part of the world are ideas which have very much outlived the definitions that might have been pinned to them 60 years ago, as well as the periodic adjustments that have been made to these categories thereafter. Collier states that most of what was the developing world is now very much on its way, and what remains is a group of 58 nations—constituting about a billion people—who are “stuck,” not just in low income and poverty, but in a worse way: without growth, which translates to pandemic paucities of hope within these nations, and a new “diverging” world without.
Collier attributes the condition of a nation’s being stuck to 4 “development traps,” each Bottom Billion nation essentially being snagged by at least of these traps. 73% nations have recently experienced civil war or coups. 29% suffer from the drags of natural resource-dominated economies. 30% fit the profile of being landlocked, resource-scare and with bad neighbors. And 76% have been through a prolonged period of bad governance and poor economic policy. While each of these realities themselves slow or deplete growth, Collier labels them as traps because the conditions are self and inter-perpetuating.
Is Bénin Trapped?
Africa happens to be the epicenter of the Bottom Billion—not exclusively (there are others outside Africa) but enough such that Collier can rename the Bottom Billion “Africa +,” meaning a lot of African and some others. I myself read Bottom Billion with the continual curiosity of whether Bénin has in fact made Collier’s list of 58 nations. Collier doesn’t list the Bottom Billion countries by name, though he uses many as case examples throughout, including Nigeria, Niger Burkina Faso, and perhaps also Togo, all of whom are Bénin’s only neighbors.
According to the UN’s Human Development Index (a composite ranking that seeks to quantify the quality of life for the average citizen in a given country, then to compare this level of life with that of other countries) it is evident that Bénin is among the world’s poorest nations, in 2005 it was ranked the 163rd most poor of 177 nations. But what about in terms of growth or development traps? That is, the average Béninese may very well be poor, but is Bénin as a whole free of development traps such that the average Béninese can in good faithharbor hope that things will get better?
It’s clear that Bénin has never been snagged by two traps: Bénin it is not land-locked, nor has it discovered any lucrative natural resources within its national bounderies (“yet” one might add…an estimated million barrels of oil was recently just found off nearby Ghana’s coast).
However, Bénin did suffer from some of Africa’s worst Economic Policy during 1970s and 1980s which earned it the nickname the “Cuba of Africa.” In the end the economic fallout of these policies were so horribly evident to both citizens and leadership alike that they prompted in 1990 what I think might be the region’s only “peaceful revolution” to democracy. Bénin has, however, seen prolonged armed conflict and instability: before its shift to Marxism, Bénin's government was subjected to 5 coups d’etats in less than a decade. So it looks like two traps have snagged Bénin at some point in the past. But, depending on what kind of time parameters Collier’s trap categories assume, perhaps Bénin has successfully “escaped” one or both of these: Is two decades of attempted reform and over 35 years of internal peace long enough?
It may be worth noting—as Collier does—that other development traps have been proffered by other economists, most notably the “health” trap by Economist Jeffrey Sachs (put forward in The End of Poverty) a category of snares that Bénin would most likely fit into.
A Realist’s Insights
At the end of the day, I don’t think Collier’s book is meant to be read this way, as interesting as it may be to try to deduce the technical preconditions of the Bottom Billion and the exhaustive list of its constituent’s names. Rather, Collier makes many new insights on economic development, particularly for the African countries that are the materially “poorest” and proposes that Industrial Nation leaders must complement aid with certain trade policies, international laws and charters, and even military interventions in order to set the stage for escape from these growth traps. Though ultimately a conservative himself, (at the end of the day, enduring reform and change can only come from bold reformers within the nation itself), Collier acts as an alternative voice of realism between the rivaling opinion camps of economists Jeffrey Sachs (more Foreign Aid is the solution) and William Easterly (development through markets).
No matter the reader’s political-economic predisposition, even taking Collier’s claims only as suggestions has the potential to refresh the ongoing conversation on “development”…a subject whose research very much needs honest and constructive refreshment, given its complex nature and high stakes.
Saturday, March 22, 2008
America in Africa: Why Bush was Pounding Shea Nuts
The photo to the left (copywrite WATH, I think) is of Bush pounding Shea Nuts (which eventualy turns into Shea Butter) during his recent visit in Ghana. Ghana was one of the several stops (and this one of the many photo shoots) that Bush made during Bush’s February tournée of Africa.Not sure how much U.S. media attention was given to this diplomatic trip, at least “positive” media coverage. I imagine not much. However, here in Bénin (one of Bush’s stops), Bush’s visit was quite a big deal vis à vis its political importance, the vast media coverage, and even what was talked about on the street by the typical Béninese. Bénin even shut down its sole international airport for several days, and extended a runway in order to receive Air Force One, if only for a couple hours (I’m told Cotonou didn’t have sufficient hotel capacities to lodge all of the President’s numbered traveling support staff overnight).
Such a warm welcoming, however, is probably indicative of how momentous an occasion this was for many Béninese. Many seem to see this visit, which is the first time the country has ever been visited by a current U.S. president, as affirmation that Bénin, led by President Yayi Boni, is emerging as an African Nation that is stable, veritably democratic, and economically competitive. Distinctions are all the more noteworthy when they are compared with the recent histories of many of Bénin’s West African neighbors.
Yet, as I listened to my shortwave radio throughout the time of Bush’s visit and heard opinions and reports coming in from across Africa, it seemed to me that most of the sub-Sahara—not just Bénin—looked favorably upon Bush’s visit. According to Pew Research, 8 of the top 10 world countries that give America the highest approval ratings are African.
Interestingly, some of this pan-African enthusiasm comes from many Africans’ approval of the President’s self\-assured (never mind sometimes misled?) demeanor and policies—he’s a man that doesn’t just talk, but takes action. But personal motivations aside, there are in fact very good reasons for Bush’s approval ratings in much of Africa. During the course of Bush’s presidency, American aid to Africa has increased threefold, into programs combating Malaria, AIDS, and corruption, among others. Bénin for example, has received millions of dollars (through the President’s Millinium Challenge Corporation initiative) to restructure, render less corrupt and more competive, its port in Cotonou. In the diplomatic world of many worthless words, America has also been one of the most aggressive international actors actually pushing for action in Darfur.
The realist will respond that the U.S. has its interests in Africa, too. Bush, at the end of his unpopular term, certainly was in need of some positive PR. Many are saying that the President’s visit to several West African countries (Bénin, Liberia, Ghana) were prompted my expectations that the U.S. will soon be reliant on this region for 25% of its oil imports. One correlative of the President’s war on terror has been increased friendliness and aid to certain Northwest and Eastern African countries proximate to the Arab-Islamic world. And then there is the raising of support (and the securing of a location) for AFRICOM, which beginning in 2008 will be the headquarters overseeing all U.S. military, diplomatic, and developmental operations in Africa.
Bush’s presidency has left no lack of cannon fodder to be fired back at him concerning the economy, the War in Iraq, and several big domestic issues. Yet I—and apparently many Africans— think the last 8 years have been encouraging for U.S.-African policy.
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